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The September 11, 2001 terror attack in the United States was a formative event in the 
history of modern international terrorism, with a major effect on the characteristics of 
terrorist activity in the international arena, on the organization that carried it out, on the 
states supporting that organization, and, invariably, on the country in which it took place. 
Moreover, it has had a long-term impact on the fighting strategy adopted by the countries 
combating terror and on international relations in general.
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The large number of casualties, the serious economic damage, and the psychological 
effects of September 11 were unprecedented. Consequently, September 11 constituted a 
watershed in terms of the terrorism threat facing countries in all parts of the free world 
and established terrorism’s position as a significant player in international relations today. 
This has been reflected by the high profile given to terrorism in the international media, 
as well as in decision-making centers throughout the world. The attack on the heart of 
America’s military establishment and on one of the primary symbols of the American 
economy heralded the beginning of the direct confrontation between the West, led by the 
United States, and the "Afghan alumni," led by Osama Bin Laden in particular and 
terrorist organizations and terror-supporting nations in general. 
  
The overall significance of the events of September 11 is still evolving, and its full 
implications will certainly resound in the years to come. However, it is already clear that 
among the Bin Laden-led Afghan alumni and through their influence on other terrorist 
organizations, a fundamental change in consciousness has taken place regarding what is 
permitted and what is forbidden in the realm of terrorism. In the period since September 
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  111, 2001, the standard of violence in terrorism has increased significantly. The number 
and frequency of mega-terror attacks planned or executed since then attest to the fact that 
the taboo surrounding the "lethal limit" of single terrorist attacks or mass-casualty cluster 
attacks is immensely weakened. This change in consciousness is also reflected in the 
declarations of terrorist organizations’ spokespeople, and may signal a broad escalation in 
their activity and the terrorist organizations’ move into the age of non-conventional 
terrorism. 
 
Two levels of activity characterize this age. The first is the level of executing a 
monumental attack (“mega-terrorism”) using conventional warfare materials to achieve 
an effect that is fundamentally non-conventional in nature. The second level involves 
preparing terrorist attacks that use non-conventional materials in order to harm large 
numbers of people, cause long-term environmental damage, and deliver a public 
psychological and morale-crushing blow of a scope hitherto unknown. The war with Iraq 
is likely to have the negative impact of accelerating the progress of the global age of non-
conventional terrorism. 
 
In contrast, and perhaps ironically, the public and the decision makers of the Western 
world have not experienced a change in consciousness regarding the nature of the threat 
and its degree of acuteness. Such a change, however, is essential to achieving the public 
support for an anti-terrorism strategy that can adequately and effectively address the 
current terrorist threat. 
 
A Change in Consciousness 
Since the end of the 1960s, when modern international terrorism began playing an 
increasingly influential role in international relations, a large number of terrorist attacks 
have been carried out around the world. Only a small number yielded high lethal results, 
killing dozens and in rare cases hundreds of people. Exceptionally severe attacks were 
carried out infrequently, typically by different organizations and at significant intervals. 
Airplanes provided a ready venue for such attacks: 329 people were killed by the 
explosion of an Air India plane by Sikh terrorists in June 1985, and 270 people were 
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work of Libyan agents. In some instances, car bombs loaded with thousands of kilograms 
of explosives and driven by suicide bombers were used to carry out attacks with mass 
casualties. The two terrorist attacks against United States Marines and a multinational 
French force in Beirut carried out by the Hizbollah in October 1983, which killed a total 
of 300 people, serve as primary examples of such attacks. 
 
However, mass-casualty attacks killing thousands of people have only been planned and 
attempted by terrorist groups that are Afghan alumni, led by Bin Laden and functioning 
under the auspices of al-Qaeda. According to the Afghan alumni's increasingly extremist 
religious messianic worldview, the indiscriminate killing of large numbers of people is 
permitted, and even desirable, when it is done "in the path of god" (“fi sabil Allah”). 
They interpret such acts as consistent with the commandments of the Koran and Islamic 
law. In this context, the transition to carrying out mega-terror attacks can be seen as a 
"natural" outcome of the cultural-religious confrontation between them and those whom 
they perceive as infidels, chiefly, in their terms, the "Judeo-Crusader alliance." Still, they 
do not refrain from the indiscriminate killing of others, such as Hindus in Kashmir and 
even "infidel" Muslims in Arab countries. 
 
September 11, with its score of more than 3,000 dead, heavy economic damage, and 
dramatization of American vulnerability, was an important morale-boosting victory for 
the Afghan alumni. It also represented a new, higher minimum standard in escalating 
terror attacks, as their architects work towards actualizing their vision of the liberating 
Islamic holy lands and establishing an Islamic caliphate throughout the world. 
 
Today, one and a half years after September 11, one can discern an increase in intensity 
and frequency in the planning and execution of mass-casualty terror attacks, which 
reflects the profound change of consciousness that has taken place at the level of violence 
sanctioned, if not encouraged, in the struggle against infidels. Accordingly,  we have 
already reached the initial and in this case accelerated phase of the age of non-
conventional terrorism. The Afghan alumni regard mega-terror attacks, whether using 
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such attacks is primarily a function of the terrorists’ performance capabilities, and timing 
is usually determined by their degree of operational preparedness and their overall 
operational strategy of maximizing the economic and psychological damage to their 
adversaries. 
 
Post-September 11 Non-Conventional Attacks  
Following the counterattack of the United States-led international coalition against the 
Taliban regime and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, which began on October 7, 2001, al-Qaeda 
renewed and intensified its global terrorism network. Determined to quash the challenge 
to its operational capabilities, members of al-Qaeda and the terrorist networks it supports 
attempted to carry out monumental attacks throughout the world. The rapid succession of 
major attacks over the past nineteen months under the umbrella of al-Qaeda testifies to an 
emboldened, defiant group. Specifically, it is the change in consciousness that allowed 
for the multitude of major attacks since September 11. 
 
The first and most prominent operation was a multi-target attack in Singapore that was 
meant to kill thousands of people, fatally injure the Singapore economy, and propel an 
extensive economic domino landslide in Southeast Asia.
2 The operation was thwarted 
when a group from the terrorist organization al-Jam`ah al-Islamiyyah was arrested in 
Singapore in December 2001. This Southeast Asian regional, multi-national organization 
has leaders and members scattered throughout Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
Its intention was to detonate simultaneously seven truck bombs filled with tons of 
explosives at the American, British, and Israeli embassies in Singapore, and strike 
American economic targets as well. Al-Qaeda was actively involved in planning the 
attack through the supervision and funding of Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, its senior 
operations agent.
3 
 
                                                           
2 Globalization of Terror, 192-93. 
3 Yoram Schweitzer, "The Capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad," Tel Aviv Notes, No. 68, March 5, 2003. 
  4On December 22 of the same year, Richard C. Reid, a British citizen who converted to 
Islam and was sent on his suicide mission by al-Qaeda, attempted to blow up an 
American Airlines passenger flight en route from Paris to Miami by igniting the 
explosives concealed in his shoe. Passengers overpowered Reid during the flight, and the 
attack was averted. 
 
In addition to dispatching suicide terrorists, detonating car bombs, and perpetrating 
shooting attacks in countries throughout the world (including Tunisia, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Kuwait, and Jordan), al-Qaeda commanders and their cohorts in Southeast Asia chose to 
focus their operations in Asia, due to the large Islamic population in key countries in the 
region (a factor that facilitated their residence, movement and operations), the relative 
weakness of the security forces, and their belief that they could destabilize the regimes 
with terrorism.  
 
In this framework, al-Jam`ah al-Islamiyyah advanced from its more routine low-level 
attacks to the spectacular mass-casualty attack on the island of Bali in Indonesia. Based 
on the lesson learned by its operatives in Singapore from the operational failure of the 
mega-attack, al-Jam`ah al-Islamiyyah decided to strike, with the assistance of al-Qaeda, 
“soft” targets, in this case Western tourists who visit the island in droves. On October 12, 
2002, a cell of the group blew up two of the most popular nightclubs in Bali by means of 
both a suicide bomber and a remote control detonated car bomb, carried out at close 
intervals. The attacks were planned so as to take place at peak hours, and accordingly the 
casualties were extensive: approximately 200 tourists killed, including Australians, 
British, Germans, and other nationalities. The economic damage to the tourism industry, 
which constitutes a central component of the Indonesian economy, was immense, and the 
detrimental impact on the Indonesian economy is expected to be felt long into the future. 
  
Al-Qaeda chose to attack in other geographical areas as well. On November 29, 2002, al-
Qaeda members, using a local infrastructure, carried out two nearly simultaneous attacks 
against Israeli targets in Kenya. The first attack was the attempted downing of an Israeli 
Arkia Air Lines plane carrying 271 passengers and crew; the two SAM 7 missiles 
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vehicle loaded with explosives and driven by two suicide attackers was detonated at the 
entrance of the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa. The hotel is Israeli owned, and its guests 
were Israeli travelers who had arrived at the hotel a short time before the attack, on the 
same Arkia plane that embarked on the return flight to Israel. Fifteen people were killed 
and dozens were injured in the attack at the Paradise Hotel. 
 
The attack on the theater in Moscow by a terrorist network of more than 40 Chechneyan 
militants, including Arab Afghan alumni as well, may be added to the list. The captors, 
who held 650 hostages for three days, were armed with a large number of weapons and 
explosive belts. They booby-trapped the building and threatened to detonate it with the 
hostages inside if their demands were not met. Like the other attacks, this event 
concluded with a high casualty tally: more than 100 hostages and dozens of captors were 
killed during the rescue operation of the Russian security forces. 
 
Preparations for Using Non-Conventional Weapons 
Very few terrorist attacks using non-conventional weapons have been carried out in the 
past. Best known are the attacks carried out in Japan by the Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme 
Truth) cult in 1994-1995. Of these, the deadliest one was perpetrated in Tokyo in 1995 
and involved releasing sarin nerve gas, which killed a dozen Japanese and injured 
thousands. Although the attack in Japan was the focus of considerable media coverage, as 
well as many academic studies and articles, it remained an exceptional, marginal 
phenomenon that was not imitated by other terrorist organizations.  
 
Armed with extremist ideology and an agenda of indiscriminately killing their enemies in 
masses, the Afghan alumni’s escalation within the international terrorism arena over the 
1990s led them almost naturally to invest efforts in acquiring non-conventional weapons. 
Bin Laden’s unequivocal 1999 statement that he regards the acquisition of such weapons 
as mandatory and as a religious commandment only increased fears that the day would 
soon come that this threat would be transformed from the potential to the actual. The 
United States attack on the Shifa medicine factory in Sudan, which was suspected of 
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expression of senior al-Qaeda leaders regarding non-conventional terrorism was the 
September 2002 television interview granted by Khaled Sheikh Mohammad to the 
television program Sirri l’il-Ghaya ("Top Secret"), broadcast on al-Jazeera. Khaled 
Sheikh, who supervised the September 11 attack and was arrested in early March 2003 in 
Pakistan, acknowledged that one of the directions considered by al-Qaeda on the eve of 
September 2001 was an attack on a nuclear reactor in the United States. At the time the 
idea was rejected out of concern that a successful attack of this nature would unleash 
uncontainable consequences and events would rapidly spiral out of control. Since then, 
hesitations of this sort appear to have abated. 
 
The attack in Afghanistan uncovered numerous documents and extensive photographic 
documentation of training camps and hideouts of al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan. This 
documentation indicated the readiness of al-Qaeda and its affiliates to use non-
conventional materials in terrorist attacks aimed at killing thousands of people. The most 
chilling documentation was broadcast on CNN in August 2002, showing the experimental 
use of poisonous substances on dogs in training camps in Afghanistan. This 
documentation can be added to the testimony of arrested al-Qaeda members such as 
Ahmed Rassam (arrested while attempting to smuggle weapons from Canada to the 
northwestern United States, as part of his plan to blow up the Los Angeles airport on the 
eve of the new millennium), who at his trial acknowledged that he and his colleagues 
underwent training with poisonous substances. 
 
In addition, a number of events took place since September 11 that are likely to help and 
accelerate the formation of a "consciousness environment" supportive of the Afghan 
alumni's desire to use non-conventional warfare substances in their terrorist attacks. 
  The explosion at the chemical factory in Toulouse, France, in September 
2001 appears to have been caused by an act of sabotage carried out by a 
French Islamist of North African descent hired by the factory just a few days 
before the explosion. The incident caused the death of 29 people, as well as 
serious environmental damage. The French authorities went to great lengths 
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attack of September 11 appears to have been an act of protest most likely by 
an American scientist with no al-Qaeda involvement, it played a significant 
role in raising the standard of non-conventional operations, from chemical 
terrorism to biological terrorism. Despite the relatively small number of 
casualties caused by only a miniscule quantity of anthrax, the attack 
functioned primarily to highlight the potential of environmental damage and 
the blow to morale that a terrorist weapon of this sort can wield. 
  The May 2002 arrest of Jose Padilla, an American citizen who converted to 
Islam, was trained in Afghanistan by al-Qaeda, and was sent by the 
organization to assess the possibilities of purchasing radiological material to 
detonate a "dirty bomb" in the United States, is also evidence of the 
operational directions of al-Qaeda in this realm. 
  The assassination of Khattab, a prominent leader of Chechnyan terrorist 
organizations, with a poisonous substance concealed inside an envelope 
resulted in Chechnyan threats of taking revenge against the Russians in the 
same manner. Moreover, the Russian security forces’ use of fentanyl gas 
while storming the Moscow Theater caused the immediate paralysis and 
eventual death of many of the captors and the hostages. This was perceived 
by the Chechnyan as an act of escalation, accelerating the non-conventional 
phase in their own struggle against the Russians. Indeed, a terrorist cell 
arrested in France at the end of 2002 had planned a revenge attack against 
Russian targets in Europe using non-conventional materials. 
  The arrest of al-Qaeda and its affiliated cells in various countries throughout 
Europe in early 2003
4 involved the January discovery in England of ricin 
(apparently only a small portion of a much larger quantity that had 
disappeared). A similar find occurred in March in France. These events 
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preparing to wage non-conventional terror campaigns. 
  The death of many al-Qaeda members, including some senior leaders and 
members of their families (for example, the wife and daughters of Dr. 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s deputy), enhances the Afghan alumni’s 
already radical worldview with the dimension of personal revenge. This is 
likely to dispel any moral inhibitions that still remained regarding the use of 
all warfare materials at their disposal and motivate them to execute terrorist 
attacks that are much more deadly than the one the world witnessed on 
September 11, 2001. 
 
The War in Iraq and Non-Conventional Terrorism 
Iraq’s record of using non-conventional warfare materials has at least until now been 
limited to acts of war against its enemy during the war with Iran and against its Kurdish 
citizens at Halabja. It is too early to assess the effects that the war in Iraq will have on the 
era of non-conventional terrorism, yet the war that intended in part to prevent the 
dissemination of non-conventional weapons and was justified as part of the fight against 
world terrorism may, at least in the short-run, encourage mega-terror attacks and 
constitute another phase in the gradual deterioration into the use of non-conventional 
weapons in the international arena.  
 
To the best of experts' knowledge, Iraq has refrained up to this point from providing 
terrorist organizations functioning under its auspices with non-conventional warfare 
materials, and it is possible that it will continue to act in this manner in the future. At the 
same time, it can be presumed that the longer belligerent engagements in Iraq last and the 
more civilian casualties they cause, the more likely Iraq may be used as an inspiration 
and a pretext for terrorist organizations throughout the world to carry out terrorist 
operations against those identified as participating in or supporting the war. Some attacks 
would be specific localized targets, while others would undoubtedly be indiscriminate 
and involve mass casualties. It can also be presumed that the various Afghan alumni 
would lead the terrorists: indication of this intention was provided by a video cassette 
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recently distributed by Bin Laden, in which he called on all Muslims to mobilize for the 
campaign and carry out suicide attacks and the mass killing of infidels by any means at 
their disposal. He portrayed the war in Iraq as a plot of the Judeo-Crusader alliance, aided 
by traitors among the leaders of the Arab world and aimed at humiliating Islam and 
robbing it of its oil riches.  
 
Thus, even if the horrifying scenario of non-conventional weapons being used in the war 
in Iraq was averted, the overall threat remains in place. Consequently, countries of the 
free world, primarily those of the West, have a supreme obligation to adopt firm, 
practical measures in order to stop the process of deterioration within the age of non-
conventional terrorism. In effect, the change in consciousness evident among the Afghan 
alumni since September 11 must now be internalized by the public and by decision 
makers and translated into strong anti-terror policy. Such policy demands broad 
international cooperation that is well coordinated and effective, aimed at neutralizing the 
threat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups and networks and changing the 
behavior patterns of states that support terrorism. This should be done by levying heavy 
economic, political, diplomatic, and military penalties for actively or passively assisting 
terrorist organizations. Creating new norms in the area of counterterrorism warfare in the 
international system is a prerequisite for addressing the terrorist threat facing the world 
today. 
 